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WAGE EARNER PLANS: WAGE DEDUCTION ORDERS
AND THE EMPLOYER'S POWER TO DISCHARGE
I. In Re Jacksont
Jackson, an employee of the Farmall Works of International Harvester
Company, filed a petition for relief under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act.2
 On April 14, 1967, the referee in bankruptcy entered an order confirming
the Wage Earner Plan, which provided for monthly payments to a trustee, and
appointing a trustee who was to disburse the funds to Jackson's creditors ac-
cording to the plan. The debtor failed to make regular payments to the trus-
tee; and on January 24, 1968, at the request of the trustee, the referee entered
an order requiring International to make weekly deductions from the wages
of the debtor and to pay the same to the trustee. International complied with
the order. But, invoking a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
giving it the right to discharge any employee who does not obtain a release
of any outside demand against his wages, International notified Jackson that
his employment would be suspended and eventually terminated, unless the
wage deduction order was released.
On February 12, 1968, the debtor filed a petition with the referee request-
ing that International be enjoined from suspending or terminating his em-
ployment. A temporary injunction ensued, International moved to dissolve
the injunction, and on June 27, 1968, the referee permanently enjoined Inter-
national. A petition for review was then filed by International."
International admitted the authority of the referee to order it to make the
deduction from wages but denied his authority to enjoin it from terminating
or suspending the employment of the debtor solely because of such order.
International contended that the referee lacked the authority to enjoin it
from exercising its contractual right because of the policy of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act4
 favoring collective bargaining agreements. Further-
more, under Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying that Act, 5 the
grievance procedure under a collective bargaining agreement is the exclusive
course open to an employee covered thereby who is suspended or discharged,
or threatened with either. Since International's collective bargaining agree-
ment provided for arbitration of grievances, Jackson had no right to petition
the Bankruptcy Court for an injunction.° International also contended that
the referee lacked authority to issue the injunction because, in view of the
availability of an alternative order against the employee-debtor himself, the
injunction was not really "necessary" for the enforcement of the plan as re-
quired by the Bankruptcy Act. 7 The court held that the referee in bankruptcy
does have the legal authority under these circumstances to enjoin International
1 290 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. III. 1968).
2 II U.S.C. §1 1001-86 (1964).
3 290 F. Supp. at 874.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
5 See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).




from terminating the debtor's employment because of the wage deduction
order.
Since the enactment in 1938 of the Chandler Act,8
 including Chapter
XIII, one of the practical difficulties in effectuating wage earner plans has
been enlisting the cooperation of employers in making wage deductions.°
In the Kansas City area, for example, when the Chapter XIII pro-
ceedings were first undertaken, many employers objected to the
added work made necessary to comply with the orders of the
Court and refused to cooperate. Of course the Court had power to
enforce the decree by contempt proceedings and a few contempt pro-
ceedings were actually instituted. 10
Employers, however, were able both to avoid contempt proceedings and to
avoid cooperating with the court. One writer has noted that " [s] ome em-
ployers may be adamant in their refusal to make deductions of this type, pre-
ferring to discharge the employee rather than obey the court order.'"' This
was the course chosen by International in the Jackson case. It is significant
that the writers mentioning this problem,12
 including referees experienced in
Chapter XIII proceedings, do not question the right of employers to take
such action. "While the court has the power to order the employer to pay the
trustee directly, it may not be practicable to do so if such an order would
cause termination of the debtor's empIoyment." 13 The Jackson case is signif-
icant because it is the first reported in which a bankruptcy court has en-
joined an employer from discharging a debtor-employee. The importance of
the case is heightened by the fact that this denial obviated a right to discharge
for a cause specifically enumerated in a collective bargaining agreement. Ob-
viously this decision, if followed in the future, will contribute considerably
to the effectiveness of Chapter XIII wage earner plans. But at the same time
it imposes a heretofore unrecognized restriction on an employer's right to dis-
charge his employees. Whether this case establishes a wise precedent depends
upon the balance which can be struck between the employer's rights, the
employee's needs, public policy and existing legislation.
II. THE CONFLICT WITH THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
International's first argument suggested that a conflict exists between
the status under the Labor-Management Relations Act of its bargained-for
8 See Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Stipp. 143, 148
(1968). The Chandler Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 930, made considerable
changes in the Bankruptcy Law.
9
 See generally Brown, A Primer on Wage-Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Bus. Law. 682 (1962) ; Bundschu, Administration of Wage
Earners' Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, 18 Ref. J. 55 (1944) ; Hess, Wage-Earner Plans
in Oregon, 47 Ore. L. Rev. 146 (1968) ; Kennedy, Debt Pooling Arrangements vs. Chapter
XIII Proceedings, 32 Ref. J. 109 (1958) ; Pomeroy, The Wage Earner and the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 2 Portland U.L. Rev. 2 (Spring 1952) ; Zubrensky, The Why and How
of Federal Wage Earners' Plans, 3 Prac. Law. 35 (March 1957).
10 Pomeroy, supra note 9, at 5.
11 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 113.
12
 See Brown, Bundschu, Hess, Kennedy, Pomeroy, Zubrensky, supra note 9.
13 Hess, supra note 9, at 149.
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right (admittedly a discretionary right) to discharge employees who suffer
demands against wages and the equity power of the referee under the Bank-
ruptcy Act to enjoin an employer from exercising that right. International
contended that federal policy favors the practice of collective bargaining and
the settlement of disputes by bargaining between employers and representa-
tives of their employees. The court responded that in this case no such conflict
arose since the Labor-Management Relations Act does not undertake to reg-
ulate bankruptcy proceedings. The court felt that International was in a posi-
tion no different from that of an employer who has no union contract. Inter-
national had simply the same discretion as such an employer to decide whether
to discharge an employee who suffers demands against his wages. The court
assumed that an employer without a union contract could be validly enjoined
from discharging an employee solely because of a wage deduction order ; and
that, since " [s] urely nothing in the Labor Management Relations Act, or any
decision of court in relation thereto, means that by collective bargaining
agreement an employer can create for himself the authority to decide whether
a valid wage deduction order of a court of bankruptcy shall be effective or
not,"14 an injunction against International is equally valid. In other words,
the fact that International's right was incorporated into a collective bargain-
ing agreement gave it no special status.
Another recent case, although very different factually, raised a question
regarding the status of a collective bargaining agreement in a bankruptcy
proceeding. In Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc.in the
issue stated by the court was whether the trustee of a bankrupt corporation
has the power to reject as an executory contract a collective bargaining agree-
ment in force between the bankrupt and a labor union at the time of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 16 Here Section 70b of the Bankruptcy
Act, authorizing a trustee in bankruptcy to reject executory contracts, was
involved. The union did not contest that the collective bargaining agreement
was an executory contract nor that in general a trustee may reject an execu-
tory contract. However, the union did argue that "federal legislation in the
field of labor relations has so preempted the field as to take collective bar-
gaining agreements out of the scope of section 70b." 17 The court viewed this
issue as a question involving "the status of a labor contract in a straight
bankruptcy proceeding" 18 and termed it "an important question as to the
relationship between federal labor legislation, namely the National Labor
Relations Act . . . and the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act . on the one hand, and section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act . . . on
the other hand."16 The court rejected the union's contention on the ground
that it implied a conflict between federal labor legislation and the Bankruptcy
Act which the court did not believe to exist. It based its conclusion on the
14 290 F. Supp. at 876.
15 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
16 Id. at 144.
17 Id. at 147.
18 Id. at 149.
16
 Id. at 144.
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absence of any language in either the labor legislation or the Bankruptcy
Act which would exclude collective bargaining agreements from the oper-
ation of section 70b, and attributed added significance to this fact because
of the presence of such exclusionary language in section 77n.2° The court
also noted the lack of special status for collective bargaining agreements
in proceedings under Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, citing
cases2' holding that the power to reject executory contracts under these
chapters extends to collective bargaining agreements.
International's argument in the principal case is substantially the same
as that of the union in Carpenters. International claimed that the favored
position of the Labor-Management Relations Act put International's contrac-
tual right to discharge an employee for a stated cause beyond the power of
a referee under Chapter XIII to issue orders to employers. Although previous
decisions have dealt specifically with the power of the Bankruptcy Court to
reject collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts under other
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, these cases did involve a question of the
status of a collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy proceedings. Since
the courts have found no special status for such agreements in proceedings
under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, there is no reason why such
status should exist in a Chapter XIII proceeding. It would seem that the
absence of exclusionary language in Chapter XIII would have the same impli-
cations as it did for section 70b in Carpenters, particularly since Chapter
XIII, Chapters X and XI and section 70b were enacted as part of the same
statutory scheme.22
 Although the court in the principal case did not employ
this analysis, its conclusion that International had only the same discretionary
right as an employer without a union contract is consistent with findings that
a collective bargaining agreement has no special status in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. If it is asumed that a referee has authority to enjoin an employer
without a union contract from discharging an employee solely because of a
wage deduction order, it is logical that the employer should not be able to
negate that authority simply by incorporating his previously possessed right
into a collective bargaining agreement.
Since International's contract provision gives its right to discharge no
special status, the referee's power to enjoin it from discharging Jackson de-
pends upon the referee's power generally to enjoin employers from such
action. In assuming this general authority of the referee the court relied on
Sections 658 23 and 2(a) 24 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 658 provides, with
respect to wage earner plans:
20 Id. at 149.
21 Id. at 150. See In re Maher Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Chap-
ter XI) ; In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir.11947) (Chapter X).
22 See Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143, 148
(1968) ; Copenhaver, Bankruptcy—Rights and Powers in Chapter XIII, 68 W. Va. L.
Rev. 375, 377 (1966). See also Nadler, Rehabilitation of the Insolvent Wage Earner
Under the Bankruptcy Act: A Challenge to Minnesota, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 377, 378 (1958).
23 11 U.S.C. § 1058 (1964).
24 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (15) (1964).
731
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
During the period of extension, the court—
(1 ) shall retain jurisdiction of the debtor and his property for all
purposes of the plan and its consummation and shall have super-
vision and control of any agreement or assignment, provided for in
the plan, in respect to any future earnings or wages of the debtor ;
and
(2) may issue such orders as may be requisite to effectuate the pro-
visions of the plan, including orders directed to any employer of
the debtor. An order directed to such employer may be enforced in
the manner provided for the enforcement of judgments.
Section 2 (a), on jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy, provides that:
(a) The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts
of bankruptcy ... are invested ... with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity ... to--
(1 5) Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judg-
ments, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title: Pro-
vided, however, That an injunction to restrain a court may be
issued by the judge only ... .
As defined in the Bankruptcy Act, the word "court" includes the referee. 25
The language of the above provisions clearly gives broad equitable powers
to a referee in bankruptcy to issue orders to a debtor's employer. Wage
deduction orders are frequently used to effectuate wage earner plans. Reported
decisions pertaining to such orders are few," but the background of Chapter
XIII demonstrates that the orders were within the scope of congressional
intention. Prior to the enactment of Chapter XIII, which first provided for
wage earner plans, during the Depression years considerable concern centered
on the increasing number of bankruptcies among wage earners. In Birming-
ham, Alabama, special referees were appointed to develop a rehabilitation
program for wage earners that would allow them to avoid the stigma of
bankruptcy and to provide for the payment of creditors out of the debtor's
future earnings rather than for partial satisfaction of debts out of his existing
assets." Plans worked out for wage earners were often ineffective because
of default on the part of the wage earners. The following excerpt describes
developments up to the enactment of Chapter XIII:
Judge Nesbit" primarily took the position that once a plan had been
25 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1964).
26 See Copenhaver, supra note 22.
27 See Haden, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans—Forgotten Man Bankruptcy, 55
Ky. L. J. 564 (1967).
There are two types of wage earner plans. One is an extension, providing for
payment of creditors in full. The other is a composition, providing for payment of a
percentage to creditors in satisfaction of their claims. Note, Chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act: As Maine Goes, So Should the Nation, 5 San Diego L. Rev. 329, 331-32
(1968).
28 Referee Nesbit was one of the special referees appointed in Birmingham and he
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worked out for a wage earner and accepted by his creditors it then
became the duty of the court to see that the debtor or bankrupt car-
ried out the plan by making prompt payments of the amount agreed
upon. When a debtor failed to make payments as agreed upon, the
Referee would issue an order on this individual's future earnings
which in effect caused the employer to either make a deduction of
the monthly payments or send the employee's entire earnings into
court where the deduction was made.
This procedure was frowned upon by the appellate courts. How-
ever, it was desirable and everyone felt that it was necessary in order
to successfully conclude a reasonable percentage of the cases filed.
Therefore, when the Chandler Act was written, many of the special
procedures developed by the Referees in Birmingham were adopted
and written into the new Chandler Act."
It is obvious, then, that section 658, "including orders directed to any employer
of the debtor," was written with wage deduction orders in mind. But, as noted
previously ;
 uncooperative employers could circumvent such orders by termi-
nating the employment of employee-debtors. Thus, where the employer's
cooperation could not be obtained, the bankruptcy court usually had to resort
to the alternative of an order against the debtor himself. But no attempt was
made to enjoin the employer from discharging the debtor.
That such an injunction was not considered is understandable in view
of earlier court decisions holding that an employer could discharge his em-
ployees for any reason or no reason. " [W]here no contract ... stands in
ithe way, it s the unquestioned right ... of the employer to discharge at his
pleasure. . . ."3 ° This right can be limited by law, as noted by the Supreme
Court in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. "Management
hires and fires, pays and promotes, supervises and plans. All these are
part of its function, and absent a collective bargaining agreement, it may be
exercised freely except as limited by public law. .."31 The rationale for
this position is that the "employer has an interest in running his business as
he sees fit."32
 It is not surprising that while this attitude prevailed bankruptcy
courts would be hesitant to intervene.
Despite this background, the court in the Jackson case was not at all
hesitant in assuming the authority of the referee to enjoin Jackson's discharge.
This shift in attitude is not entirely unpre cedented. In Petermann v: Team-
sters Local 396, 33 the union, as employer, discharged its business agent be-
cause he refused to perjure himself before a legislative investigating com-
mittee. The union-employer claimed the right to discharge its employee
was recruited by Chandler to prepare the draft of Chapter XIII. Note, Chapter XIII
of the Bankruptcy Act: As Maine Goes, So Should the Nation, supra note 27, at 330.
29
 Letter from Referee Allkood to the author in Haden, Supra note 27, at 582-83
(footnote added).
So Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554, 112
P. 886, 888 (1910).
31 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
32 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 624 (1960). See the cases cited therein at 624 n.4.
33 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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because the employment contract was terminable at the will of either party.
The court agreed with the general principle but qualified it:
An examination of plaintiff's first cause of action discloses that he is
predicating his right to redress upon an employment contract which
does not contain any fixed period of duration. Generally, such a
relationship is terminable at the will of either party. . . . However,
the right to discharge an employee under such a contract may be
limited by statute . . . or by considerations of public policy. 34
(Emphasis added.)
The Petermann holding has been recognized as a new development:
[T]he extension of the holding which denies an employer the right
to discharge an employee under a contract terminable at will where
the reasons underlying the discharge are contrary to public policy
appears to be an innovation in the law of employment relationships,
since it has universally been held that under such a contract an
employer may discharge his employees for any reason, without
subjecting himself to liability as
But at least in circumstances like those in the Petermann case, where the
employee would have been required to commit perjury to keep his job,
the decision would appear to be well justified and the following comment is
especially appropriate:
Notwithstanding the oft-repeated admonition that public policy is
an "unruly horse" and should be used with care in any judicial de-
cision changing conventional common-law doctrines, where, as here,
the policy consideration is clear and strong, its application would
appear mandatory."
There are two bases, then, other than contractual restrictions, on which an
employer's right to discharge employees can be limited: statutory grounds
or public policy considerations. In the principal case it is arguable both that
the Bankruptcy Court's authority to effectuate a wage earner's plan by
issuing "orders directed to any employer of the debtor" is a statutory limita-
tion and that the public policy underlying Chapter XIII limits the employer's
right to discharge. As a statutory limitation, Chapter XIII provides for wage
deduction orders and also authorizes the Bankruptcy Court to issue any orders
necessary to effectuate the wage earner plan. The court is also empowered to
"issue such process . . . as may be necessary for the enforcement of the pro-
visions of this Act. . . . "37 If it is conceded that the right of the employer to
discharge his employees is not absolute, there can be no bar to an injunction
against discharge solely because of a wage deduction order necessary to
complete the wage earner plan where the referee is given such broad powers to
34 Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
15 14 Rutgers L. Rev., supra note 32, at 624.
36 Id. at 626.
37 See note 24 supra.
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protect the plan. The court in Jackson frames the issue as a rhetorical
question:
It is here conceded that the wage deduction order to an employer
is proper to effectuate a wage earner plan. May such order then be
rendered a complete nullity by an employer discharging the debtor
from employment for no reason except that he suffered the wage
deduction order to be issued? 38
This view draws further support from cases holding that, to effectuate the
purpose of the proceedings, equity powers in Chapter XIII cases should be
more liberally exercised and injunctive relief more readily granted than in
other proceedings. 38
 The policy considerations here are, perhaps, less striking
than those in Petermann. Nevertheless, as the court notes,
Congress has decided that this is in the interest of the creditors and
trade and commerce generally. It will tend to see debts paid rather
than to be discharged unpaid in ordinary bankruptcy, and it may
help to bring order to the financial lives of debtor wage earners.°
The primary purpose of Chapter XIII is the rehabilitation of wage earner-
debtors,'" a goal which Congress has determined to be in the public interest.
It seems reasonable to limit the employer's right to discharge employees if
the exercise of this right frustrates the effectiveness of Chapter XIII. On
the basis, then, of the broad statutory powers given to the referee to issue
orders to implement wage earner plans and of the public policy underlying
Chapter XIII, the referee has the authority to enjoin an employer from
discharging an employee solely on account of a wage deduction order. The
incorporation of the employer's right to discharge into a collective bargaining
agreement subject to federal legislation does not place that right beyond
the reach of the referee's authority.
However, in the Jackson case International's union contract argument
presented a further difficulty for the court. International contended that, in
the light of Supreme Court decisions holding that the grievance procedure
under a collective bargaining agreement is the exclusive course open to an
employee covered thereby who is suspended or discharged or threatened with
either, Jackson had no .right to seek recourse through the Bankruptcy Court.
The contract provision in question authorized discharge of employees who
suffered demands against wages for which they did not obtain a release. 42
The court agreed with International that wage deduction orders issued by the
referee were clearly within the scope of that contract provision and conceded
that, but for the bankruptcy proceeding, Jackson could not bring suit for
contract violation due to his discharge. But, the court said,
38 290 F. Supp. at 874-75.
38 See In re Bradford, 268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967); In re Arzaga, 204 F.
Supp. 617, 620 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
40 290 F. Supp. at 876.
41 Hallenbeck v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1963) ;
In re Hendren, 240 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Ohio 1965).
42 290 F. Supp. at 875.
735
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Debtor's action here is not a suit for contract violation, or an effort
to substitute this court for the arbitrator under the contract. No
question of contract interpretation or application is really before
this Court. Debtor's action here is in the nature of a report to the
Bankruptcy Court that the Wage Earner Plan under administration,
and the wage deduction order, are in jeopardy. . .
The court's reasoning here is sound. True, as the Supreme Court held in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox," under ordinary circumstances contract
grievance procedures must, unless specified as nonexclusive, be exhausted
before legal redress is sought. There the Court stated:
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor
policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract
grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure
agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress. . . .
[U]nless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that
the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his
behalf. . . . And it cannot be said, in the normal situation, that con-
tract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of
an aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to imple-
ment the procedures and found them so."
But it has been stated that " [a] n employee is not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies . . . where it is shown that it would be useless to go
through the steps of the grievance procedure."" For example, in Protective
Workers v. Ford Motor Ca 9 7
 the court stated that the "briefs of the de-
fendant . . . show clearly that the defendant did not consider its action as
constituting a breach of the bargaining agreement and that it would have
been useless to have gone through the various steps of the grievance pro-
cedure.. . . Parties are not required to do a useless thing." 48 If in the Jackson
case the employee had claimed that the wage deduction order of the referee
was not within the scope of the contract provision and that therefore his dis-
charge was wrongful, that claim would have been one for arbitration since it
would involve interpretation of the contract. But with that question removed
from the case, either because through arbitration the discharge was found to be
valid under the terms of the contract or because, as he're, the parties did not
dispute its validity, no contractual dispute remains for an arbitrator to
decide. The question facing the court was whether, even though International
had the right to discharge Jackson under the terms of the contract, the
referee had the power to enjoin the exercise of that right. Under the circum-
stances of the case that question would have remained even if arbitration
43 Id. at 876.
44 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
45 Id. at 652-53.
46 Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer,
8 Lab. L.J. 316, 321 (1957). See also the cases cited therein at 321 n.27.
47 194 E.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952).
48 Id. at 1002.
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had first been attempted. Thus it would have been "useless" to require
arbitration.
However, some potential conflict still remains with the province of
arbitration. Jackson does not prevent discharge of a debtor for substantial
reasons other than a wage deduction order, even though such discharge would
have the effect of nullifying the order. International stated that its sole reason
for discharging Jackson was the wage deduction order, but pointed out that
the injunction could require the bankruptcy court to examine the stated
cause of any future suspension or discharge to determine whether the injunc-
tion had been violated. The same result could be reached in the situation
where the employer initially stated another cause for discharge against a
debtor who happened to have had a wage deduction order issued. In either
case it would have to be determined whether the stated cause was a subterfuge
for evading the wage deduction order. The court felt that it would be its
function to resolve that question:
[I] f other reason of any substance does exist at any time for suspen-
sion or discharge, such action would not violate the injunction. Such
determination by the Court should not be in any sense a determina-
tion of whether "cause" for discharge existed under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, and the procedures contained in
that agreement should govern that determination, if the employer's
action were to be otherwise reviewed. 49
 (Emphasis added.)
But, for the court to decide whether the wage deduction order was the actual
cause of discharge, it would have to determine the merits of the stated cause.
That determination would seem to be properly one for arbitration. The alter-
native would be to require the submission of the question of actual cause to
arbitration and, if the arbitrator found no substantial cause other than the
wage deduction order existed, the referee could then enjoin the discharge. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that the bankruptcy court, with its interest
in protecting its own proceedings, would be tempted to disregard an arbi-
trator's finding that there was merit to the stated cause for discharge. Thus
under the Jackson ruling it appears that, so long as there were a wage deduc-
tion order in effect, a debtor employee threatened with discharge for any
reason might be given an alternative recourse through the bankruptcy court
in addition to the ordinarily exclusive arbitration procedure.
III. THE NECESSITY ARGUMENT
In the foregoing discussion it was apparent that sections 658 and 2(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act give broad powers to a referee to issue orders to
effectuate wage earner plans. Section 658 specifies such orders "as may be
requisite to effectuate the provisions of the plan" and section 2(a), "as may
be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act." International
contended that the referee's injunction in the Jackson case did not meet the
"necessary" requirement. In support of this argument International cited
United States v. Krakover, 5° where the court held that the United States,
4
 290 F, Supp. at 875.
50 377 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1967).
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as an employer, could not be required to obey a wage deduction order of a
referee. Because of the immunity of the United States to suit, there would
be no means to enforce the order. The court pointed out that the referee had
an adequate alternative, an order to the debtor to endorse and turn over his
paychecks to the trustee, which would not deprive federal employees of the
benefit of Chapter XIII, and which would protect the trustee and the creditors,
and which would not infringe upon the immunity of the United States. Inter-
national argued that " [s] ince this possibility of an alternative order against the
Debtor exists, the injunction against it is not 'necessary for the enforcement of
the provisions of this Act.' "51 The court answered that a wage deduction order,
or an injunction against termination of employment of the debtor solely
because of it, is not "unnecessary" simply because a less effective alterna-
tive exists. In providing for wage deduction orders, the court said, Congress
recognized their superiority over orders against employees." It observed that
to adopt International's position would mean, in effect, that " [w] hile Referees
do have authority to issue wage deduction orders to employers to effectuate
Wage Earner Plans, if an employer decides to discharge such employee be-
cause of such order, then the Referee must withdraw the order to prevent
the discharge and issue a new order against the employee to require endorse-
ment of his paycheck."53
Although the referee has the authority to issue such orders to employers
as are required to effectuate the wage earner plan, whether or not a collective
bargaining agreement is involved, "the power to enjoin . . is not absolute,
but subject to the sound discretion of the Referee." 54 The basic question
involved is the propriety of the injunction. Determination of its propriety
requires a balance between the necessity of the injunction to the protection
of the Bankruptcy Court's proceedings and the importance of the employer's
right to discharge his employees. In this process of accommodation considera-
tion must be given to the effect of the injunction upon the collective bargain-
ing agreement and to the potentiality of infringement by the injunction upon
contract grievance procedures.
A Chapter XIII wage earner plan is dependent for its funds upon the
debtor's future earnings 55
 and is entirely voluntary with the debtor." But
the experience of the bankruptcy courts administering such proceedings has
been that it is almost always impractical to rely upon the debtor to make
voluntary payments to the trustee. 57
After an impetuous start the debtor left to his own devices will all
too often find it constitutionally impossible to carry on. Unless the
capacity to miss payments is taken completely out of his hands-
51 290 F. Supp. at 877.
52 Id .
53 Id.
54 See In re Willett, 265 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
55 Bankruptcy Act § 601-84, 11	 § 1001-84 (1964) ; In re Hendren,
240 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Ohio 1965); In re Belkin, 232 F. Supp. 850, 852 (W.D. Mich.
1964).
56 See In re Hendren, 240 F. Supp. 807, 807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1965). See also Copen-
haver, supra note 22, at 375.
57 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 113.
738
WAGE EARNER PLANS
unless lie can be forced to make them—the plan is virtually doomed
to failure before it starts. 56
Believing that rehabilitation of these debtor-wage earners was an important
public policy, the courts chose methods of ensuring payments, orders to
employers to make deductions from the debtors' wages or to turn over debtors'
entire paychecks to the trustee or orders to the debtors themselves to endorse
and turn over their paychecks to the trustee. For these same reasons provisions
were included in Chapter XIII requiring debtors undertaking wage earner
plans to submit future earnings to the "supervision and control of the court
for the purpose of enforcing the plan" 55
 and authorizing "orders directed to
any employer of the debtor." 6° All of the above-mentioned methods would
appear to be effective for enforcing payments. But there is no question that
the most effective method is some kind of wage assignment. One writer takes
the position that
[a] wage assignment from debtor to trustee is the key to a successful
wage earner plan. Years of experience have taught the writer that
the great majority of plans fail without such assignment. It cannot
be stressed too strongly that the wage assignment is a sine qua non
to success. . . 61
The major problem with orders to the debtors themselves would seem to be
enforcement. The court may enforce such orders through contempt proceed-
ings.°2
 Contempt actions might be effective if the problem were simply a matter
of debtors' unwillingness to obey the court orders. But debtors undertaking
wage earner plans do so voluntarily and usually with the desire to pay off
their debts." Their major difficulty is the lack of self-discipline necessary
to do so.
If these debtors of good intentions were also persons of iron will, this
power [to enforce payments] might not be of primary importance;
but they are not persons of iron will or they wouldn't be in the con-
dition they are in to begin with. The best intentions in the world
can vanish like vapor with the first chill wind of adversity or under
the first rosy blush of temptation."
Under such circumstances the threat of contempt action might deter some,
but not many. The more likely effect of this threat would be that debtors
discontinue wage earner plans, as they may do,65 and enter straight bank-
ruptcy, the very result which Chapter XIII proceedings seek to avoid.
55 Id.
55 Bankruptcy Act § 646(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4) (1964).
110
 Bankruptcy Act § 658(2), 11 U.S.C. § 1058(2) (1964).
61 Zubrensky, Successful Use of the Federal Wage Earner Plan, 9 Prac. Law. 31, 33
(October 1963).
62 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 113.
63 See, e.g., Kennedy, Zubrensky, supra note 9. See also Note, Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act: As Maine Goes, So Should the Nation, supra note 28, at 330.
64
 Kennedy, supra note 9, at 113.
65 See Rice v. Minims, 291 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961); In re Hendren, 240 F. Supp.
807 (S.D. Ohio 1965).
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Certain administrative reasons also favor orders to employers over those
to debtors: "It can readily be seen that with 8,000 payments due weekly,
bi-weekly or monthly, a trustee's office would literally be engulfed if each
debtor were required or allowed to make his payment in person."" Orders
to employers requiring them to turn over the entire paychecks of debtors
do not have the same drawbacks. But they do increase the administrative
work, requiring the trustees to cash the checks, make the necessary deduc-
tions, and then remit the balance to the debtor. They were also felt not to be
in the best interests of the debtor:
This did not appeal to us because we did not like to handle all of
his money, and furthermore felt that the least contact the wage
earner was compelled to have with the court and its officers for the
duration of the plan, the better off he would be. In other words we
wanted the wage earner to become self reliant and to retain as much
of his independence as possible under the plan a7
An accommodation of all these considerations results from the wage deduction
method. This procedure includes several advantages:
The best solution to this problem is to ask the employers, especially
those with large numbers of employees in wage earner arrangements,
to deduct the required sum from each pay check Of each debtor in
their employ, and once each month to remit the total sum deducted
from all employee-debtors to the trustee, attached to a list showing
the amount remitted for each debtor. This not only simplifies the
trustee's work but is a convenience to the debtors who are thereby
saved many trips to the trustee's office. . . . Naturally, the certainty
and regularity of payment is greatly improved by this system."
Thus, while wage deduction orders may not be necessary in an absolute
sense, they are desirable as the most effective implementation of the policies
underlying Chapter XIII.
On the other hand, of course, certain considerations weigh in favor of
the employer's right to discharge employees because of demands against
their wages. It is not uncommon for employers to be annoyed at wage attach-
ments against their employees' wages" and frequently such attachments have
been the cause of an employee's discharge. The usual justification is the
burden of added bookkeeping and expense required of the employer. Another
source of annoyance has been the collection methods used by creditors of
the employees.70 In the principal case, International used the argument of
increased administrative burdens, pointing out that it "employs over 90,000
people in 21 plants at various locations and has frequent involvement with
Wage Earner Plans under the Bankruptcy Act.""-
66 Maulitz, Operations Under Chapter XIII, 27 Ref. J. 68 (1953).
67 Bundschu, supra note 9, at 55.
68 Maulitz, supra note 66, at 68-69.
69 See, e.g. Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 19 Bus. Law. 271, 273 (1963).
70 Id. at 273.
71 290 F. Supp. at 875.
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However, offsetting factors should be recognized. Employers now generally
make a variety of required and voluntary payroll deductions, and with book-
keeping systems so arranged, less inconvenience arises for employers today
than did previously in compliance with wage deduction orders. 72 The court
in Jackson notes that International makes deductions for almost 3200 of
3650 employees at its Farman Works for the employees' credit union, for
employees' purchases of United States Bonds, and for tax deductions required
by law. Thus, " [c]ontinued compliance with the order will work no important
hardship on International. . . ."73 Perhaps even more important, instead of
constituting an administrative burden, the use of Chapter XIII can actually
protect employers from the problems involved with wage attachments. Under
Chapter XIII the bankruptcy court can bar wage attachments based on claims
filed both prior and subsequent to commencement of the wage earner plan."
On balance, then, since wage deduction orders can contribute considerably to
the effectiveness of Chapter XIII proceedings and since the burden upon em-
ployers is not substantial, ample justification exists for restraining employers
from resisting such orders by discharge of employees. As the court states in
Jackson:
Chapter XIII places a duty on the employer to assist in this manner
in the rehabilitation of the Debtor, if the Referee so orders and the
Debtor is otherwise worthy of continued employment, for the benefit
of his creditors as well as the Debtor himself. This declared public
policy should be carried out in the absence of unreasonable burden
on the employer in so doing."
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapter XIII is important social legislation designed to assist wage
earners experiencing financial difficulty. Since inception it has encountered a
number of difficulties impeding its acceptance in practice. One of the major
obstacles has been the frequency of default on the part of debtors. Con-
sequently, the history of Chapter XIII has been in large part one of experi-
mentation by the bankruptcy courts with methods to obtain sufficient control
over the funds essential to the success of wage earner plans so as to ensure
the successful completion of a significant proportion of such plans. It has long
been recognized that the most effective method of obtaining the necessary
control is the issuance of a wage deduction order to the debtor's employer.
But uncooperative employers have until the present time been able to frustrate
such orders and, where they have done so, the courts have been required to
employ less effective alternatives. The courts should not be made to resort to
secondary methods where a wage deduction order does not place an unreason-
able burden upon an employer. Certainly an employer has an interest in run-
ning his business as he sees fit. But the employees and the public offer coun-
tervailing interests to be considered. An employee ought to be able to take
72 Maulitz, supra note 66, at 69.
73 290 F. Supp. at 878.
74 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964) ; See Note, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act: As
Maine Goes, So Should the Nation, supra note 27, at 340.
75 290 F. Supp. at 878.
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full advantage of Chapter XIII, enacted for his benefit, without fear of
arbitrary action on the part of his employer. At the same time, a public
interest exists in the rehabilitation of a large group of debtors. The presence
of a collective bargaining agreement should be no bar to the restriction of
the employer's right, especially when the restriction falls only on a single
specific application of a contract provision.
Some conflict may arise between the desire of the bankruptcy court to
supervise its orders and the exclusive province of collective bargaining
grievance procedures. However, it is submitted that the bankruptcy courts
will in the future exercise proper restraint and will refrain from usurping the
arbitrator's function. Thus, Jackson was correctly decided on its facts and
should provide a valuable precedent for the future.
JOHN J. FINN
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